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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Tll~~

S'r.\'rE

<>~,

UT . \H,
Pl ai uti.tJ-Respo1ul en f,
Case
No. 10073

_,·~.-

HOB 1·: Irr l) 1 1 ~ L~\ XE\~,
J)e fc 11d a11 t- .L.t }J lJell a·JI t.

BRIEF O·F RESPONDENT
~T.\TE:\LE~T

OF THE N. \TURE OF CASE

Thl' appellant, Robert Delaney, has appealed from
his ron,·ietion upon jury trial of the crime of negligent
homiride, 41-6-43.10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, in the
Fifth .T udicial District Court in and for Iron County,
the Honorable C. Nelson Day, Judge, presiding.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

.\fter full jury trial on the information, the appellant "·a~ convicted of the misdemeanor of negligent
homicide and sentenced to 60 days confinement in the
Iron County Jail.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the points urged by
the appellant do not warrant any other action by this
court than affirmance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with some of the
forth in appellant's brief, but submits the
statement of facts as being more in keeping
rule on appeal that the evidence will be viewed
most favorable to the jury's verdict.

facts set
following
with the
in a light

Shortly after midnight, in the early morning of
March 2nd, 1963, the defendant drove himself, Christine
Lambert, Michael J. Higbee and Diana :\!iller up Cedar
Canyon on Highway 14 in Iron County (T. 5, 8, 146).
Christine Lambert \Yas 17 years old at the time and
appellant was 19 (T. 471). Prior to the journey up the
canyon, the appellant had consumed four cans of beer
(T. 473-475) and possibly more (T. 338). Appellant had
been at a social gathering where beer and hard liquor
\vere available (T. 510). Although appellant did notremember, he had danced while at the gathering (T. 510).
As the journey up Cedar Canyon started, appellant
was driving, Christine Lambert \Yas sitting in the front
seat of the car next to appellant, and Mr. Higbee and ~Iiss
Miller were sitting in the rear of the vehicle (T. 151).
2\fr. Higbee had some beer in the car at the time they
left (T. 152, 382, 516).
As they started out, appellant accelerated at a very
fast rate of speed and although appellant denied running

2
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a stop sif-,'11, Iliana :\Iiller testified that he failed to stop
nt n ~ign and ut that time ,,·as going very fast, which frightl'llPd ht·r (T. :~7~, 383). She testified that although she
did not notier anything unusual as they drove up the canyon. shP liked fal4t driYing and would not be concerned
nt PX<'t'l4~iYe speed (rr. 386). During the trip up the canyon, tlu· }l'u'ties ,,·ere talking and playing a record
playt·r in tht• ear (T. ~7:3-27D, :377). The posted speed
limit in the ('anyon is 50 miles per hour (T. 68), and
frit•nds of the appellant estimated his speed "\Yell in f'Xl'P~s of .)0 miles per hour. A. B. Hatch, "\Yho passed
nppPllnnt 's ra r as it came up the canyon, estimated the
~IH'l'd at 70 mih·s per hour (T. 317) as did Sylvia Gale
\ T. :~~:>). Oa ry C. ~Inrkclprang, who "\Yas in a Yrhicle
follfnring- appellant, estimated appellant's speed as high
&lS 70 milPs per hour and indicated that he had some con('Prn during the trip up the canyon (T. 329). Delane~~
himself estimated his speed as between 60 to 65 miles
per hour (T. 484). The canyon road is a winding, curving, ele,·nted road (T. 64, 94, 186) .

. \ t a point up the canyon, the Delaney vehicle overturnetl, rPsulting in the almost instant death of Christine Lambert (T. 6, 31, 52). The vehicle came to a rest on
it~ top ('r. 6). The high,vay patrol measured 707 feet
of the radius of scuff and skid marks left by the appellant'~ vehicle before coming to rest (T. 67, 31-32). The
Yehirle traYeled across the center lines into the embankment and back onto the road. From the measurement, the
~lWt)tl of the Yehicle at the time of the accident (minimum speed) \\~as estimated at 99.9 to 101 miles per hour

3
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(T. 252, 253). The appellant indicated that he did not
apply his brakes ( T. 505) and further testified he had
been talking to his rear-seat passenger at the time of the
accident (T. 485).
Immediately after the accident, upon being questioned by Officer John R. Williams, appellant stated as
to what happened, ''I guess we were racing a little.''
(T. 6) Further the appellant consistently said with reference to the dead girl, ''I killed, I killed her. '' ( T. 7,
13, 288) Immediately after the accident, a car driven
by Mel Clark, a friend of the appellant, arrived at the
accident, skidding against a guard rail to stop ( T. 431,
328-339).
The appellant's automobile was a 1961 Chevrolet
two-door, designed as a racing vehicle, although it was
a stock car capable of being purchased on the open market ( T. 165, 166). The vehicle contained a 350 h.p. engine, four-speed transmission, and racing brakes (T.
165-166). The car had a heavy duty suspension which
'vould normally allow it to take curves better (T. 166).
In drag racing, with some mechanical changes, the appellant's car had been recorded to accelerate from a
stop to 96 miles per hour 1 within a quarter of a mile
(T. 167). It was estimated that the car was capable of
speeds of 135 to 140 miles per hour (T. 168), and the
appellant admitted that the car could probably do 120
miles per hour without being fixed up in prime racing
shape (T. 492).
1

99 miles per hour at one time (T. 167).

4
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]~asl'd

upon the abovp evidence, characterized most
favorably to the vPrdict, the jury convicted the appellant
ot" tlu.· <·rime charged. Other facts relevant to the sperifir issues raised on appeal are set out under the points
in argument. The respondent agrees with the appel);tnt that the trial, covering some four days, must be
upproarhPd as to factual sufficiency from a view of the
whole rerord eovering some 534 pages of transcript.
\\ . hrn so ,.iP\\·rd, it is submitted that a fair verdict "~as
n·turned and no basis for reversal exists.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TilE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EVIDENCE
.AXY BIAS OR PREJUDICE BY ASKING
QUESTIONS OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS
\YI-IICH WERE MERELY FOR CLARIFICATION 1\ND AN AID AT ASCERTAINING
TilE TRUTH AND UNDERSTANDING THE
EVIDENCE.
The appellant argues that the trial judge deprived
the appellant of a fair trial by interrogating a witness
for the state and thus evidencing a bias and prejudice
tow·ard the appellant. The conduct which the appellant
claims prejudiced him occurred after all the state's evidence had been presented and after most of the independent evidence of the defense had been received. During
t.he course of the state's evidence, Officer William Burch
of the High,,·ay Patrol was called as a witness ( T. 22). He
tPstified as to physic.al evidence at the accident scene (T.
~7), the position of the appellant's vehicle (T. 27), and the
coursl) and path that the vehicle followed, which he said
5
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could be clearly followed ( T. 28). He testified as to
measurements he made with respect to the vehic·le 's path
( T. 31, 32, 34). A diagram of the path of the vehicle was
made by Officer Burch on the courtroom blackboard (Exhibit D-1). Officer Burch's testimony, along 'Yith thnt of
Guy D. Neilson of the State High"Tay Department (T.
177, etc.), provided a basis for a hypothetical queRtion
to an expert who placed the appellant's speed at 99.9 to
101 miles per hour, at the minimum, at the time of the
accident (T. 252).
The appellant was agreeable to a view of the accident scene ( T. 441, 443). The court admonished the jnry
twice that they were not to engage in any unauthorized
communication ( T. 445, 446). Thereafter, the sheriff,
counsel, the accused and the jury went to the scene of
the accident. Officer Burch was also present with the
reporter ( T. 447). The court asked Officer Burch to point
out the landmarks and physical features to which he had
previously testified in court. Not one of the questions
in any ''Tay reflected any bias or prejudice on the part of
the trial judge ( T. 44 7-460). Appellant in no 'vay points
out any question or series of questions 'Yhich could be
said to evidence any bias or prejudice or be unfairly
couched toward the prosecution. No objection, bas~d on
a claim of bias or prejudice of the trial court, 'Yas ever
raised below. In addition, the appellant's counsel asked
some questions of the witness (T. 453, 454, 456, 457, 458).
The only action of the court during the course of the trial
which the appellant complains indicates prejudice (Brief
p. 16) was an admonition to the appellant not to volun6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tet•r 'vht'l'P an ans\ver he ga , . c in response to a prosecution qtu'stion \Vas non-responsive (T. 491). This did not
orrnr during the vie\Y and was proper 'vhere the witness
\vas going- afield. In contrast to the appellant's contention, the rP<'ord sho\\'S the court attempted to protect the
nppellant from prejudice at one point in the trial by
rt•st rirting the prosecution from going into a description
of thP gruesome scene at the accident, where it 'vas repetitious ( T. 39). In a deli tion, the court sustained clef ense
motions to strike (T. 180) and excluded the results of
nppellant's blood test, apparently because of a claimed
t'nilnrP of chain of custody. This ruling was extremely
fa\·orable to the appellant and \vas a Yery severe interpretation of the chain of custody requirements. Nirhols
r . .llcC'oy, ;jH Cal. 2d 447, 240 P. 2d 569; Wharton's Cri?niual f.'ridrucr, Vol. 2, p. 509, etc. (T. 207, etc.) These
facts. \\·hen vie"""ed against the whole record, and the accommodating sentence imposed (R. 40-43) clearly refute
a elaim that the trial judge was in any way biased or
prejudiced, or that his questions to Officer Burch, which
Wl'rl' for the purposes of clarifying the evidence (T. 456,
Line:>), in any \Yay unfairly treated the appellant. Additionally, after returning from the accident scene, the
court sua sponte instructed the jury (T. 461):
''THE CouRT : The record should show that
the defendant is present with his attorney and the
Jury is in the box. I believe the record should
sho'' further that \ve haYe now returned to the
Courtroom from our excursion up Cedar Canyon,
or I guess it is Cedar Canyon, isn't it, Gentlemen~ . .\ny,vay, the canyon east of Cedar, in any
event, to view the scene of the accident with 'vhich
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've are here concerned. Ladies and Gentlemen of
the Jury, so there will be no misunderstanding,
while we were at the scene of the accident for the
purpose of providing you with a view of this accident scene, and not with any idea of intention of
persuading your minds one way or the other by
the Court and by that I mean the Judge, myself,
attempted to with the assistance of Officer Burch
to elicit information as to the points which are some of them being indicated on the chalk outline
on our blackboard there. I would want you to
have no idea that the Court was in any manner
attempting to influence your thinking or your
view of the situation in any particular. What I
would think about this case as to the facts is
entirely immaterial. It is your decision and your
decision alone which will govern as to the factual
situation. I would want you to have no idea that
I was attempting to either persuade you one way
or the other, for or against the State or the defendant or in anywise by my questions or by my
attempts to assist Officer Burch in pointing these
items out to you. I want to make that very clear
to you that in no way was I attempting to influence you at any point in our excursion up
there, nor during the course of the trial, because
you are the triers of the facts.''
It should also be noted that no motion for mistrial was
made at the time of the viewing, nor did the appellant's
motion for new trial cite the present claim as a basis
for new trial (R. 38).
The general rule as to the power and duty of the
trial court to examine witnesses or call for evidence is
stated in Abbott, Criminal Tri.al Practice, § 323:
''The judge may in his discretion interpose
of his own motion to call out legal evidence by
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interrogating a witness under examination, or to
call a '"itness who should be called by the prosecution. But it is error in so doing to express opinions prejudicial to the accused or indicate to the
jury his opinion as to the merits of the case
of the credibility or weight of the evidence.''

It is not a basis to complain that the trial court's
examination is extended unless it becomes overbearing
and assumes the role of an advocate. Gordon Y. I rrin c,
105 Ga. 144, 31 S.E. 151. The court has an obligation to
see that the evidence is fully developed or is comprehendible by the jury. People v. Rongetti, 331 Ill. 581,
163 N.E. 373; TVharton' s Criminal Evidence, § 842. Generally, "'vhether or not the court shall question a 'vitness and the extent of its examination are within its
~onnd discretion." Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 842,
p. 213.
In State v-. Gleason, 86 Utah 26, 40 P. 2d 222 (1935),
a similar objection was made to that raised in the in~tant case. The court noted:
No objection is made that the questions
asked by the court elicited testimony that was
incompetent, irrelevant, or immaterial, or were
otherwise improper if such questions had been
asked by counsel for either side. The basis of the
objection is that the trial judge ought not to have
examined the witnesses at all, and that in asking
the question the judge indicated an opinion with
respect to the credibility of the witnesses examined, or, perhaps, as to the defendant's guilt, all
to defendant's prejudice before the jury.''
d

•
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This court went on to find that no prejudice resulted
from the judge's questions to several "~itnesses and
stated:
''The conduct of a trial is to a large extent
under the control and within the disc.retion of thr
trial judge who should preside \vith dignity and
impartiality. He is more than a mere referee or
moderator. State v. Keehn, 85 Kan. 765, 118 P.
851. He should not express, or otherwise indicate,
an opinion as to the credibility of the \Yitness or
the guilt of the defendant. Such matters are exclusively for the jury. The practice is well estahlished for the trial judge, w·ithin reasonable
bounds, to ask questions of any ''"'itness 'vho may
be on the stand for the purpose of eliciting the
truth, or making clear any points that otherwise
would remain obscure. 16 C. J. 831; People v.
Reid, 72 Cal. App. 611, 237 P. 824. It is generally
held that in the exercise of his right to question a
witness, the judge should not indulge in extensive
examination or usurp the function of counsel.
In a criminal case he should not by form of question or manner or extent of examination indicate
to the jury his opinion as to the guilt of the defendant or the weight or sufficiency of the evidence. Note 84 A.L.R. 1172; 28 R.C.L. 587. His
examinations should not be extensive because it is
a matter of much difficulty for any person to indulge in an extensive examination of the witness
without indicating a train of thought or some
feeling with respect to the truth or falsity of the
testimony being elicited. His attitude should at all
times be fair and impartial so that neither by
tone of voice, facial expression, nor manner of
propounding a question is bias shown ,,~hich may
prejudice the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. A trial judge is \Yithin his rights in
asking questions for the purpose of eliciting the

10
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truth or to rl0ar up an obscurity. People Y. J enkins, 118 Cal. App. 116, 4 P. (2d) 799. But in
doing so, sincerity and fairness should character. every wor d an d ac t•10n. "
izP Ius

rrhe <'OUrt determined that the questioning there,
whieh i~ not far removed from that in the instant case,

'vns not prejudicial.
..\ similar result ""'as reached in State v.
rtah 437, ~>7 P. ~tl 750 (1936). See also State
~l7 Utah -l~l~, fl-! P. 2d 414 (1939).

In

[>('ople

Y.

a reru, 89
Y.

Kallas,

I~igney, 55 Cal. 2d 234, 10 Cal. Rep. 623,

359 P. ~< l 2:-3 ( 1961), the California. Supreme Court recognized the g-vneral rules set out above by the Utah court
nnd noted:
· •Although the judge questioned defendant
and Doctor Brandmeyer at great length 'the mere
fnet that the judge examined * * * at some length
does not establish misconduct.' People v. Corrigan, supra., 48 Cal. 2d 551, 559, 310 P. 2d 953,
958 ~ People v. Montgomery, supra, 47 CaL App.
2d 1, 18, 117 P. 2d 437."
In that ease the court noted as to the facts :
''In the present case the trial judge, over defendant's objection, examined him extensively as
to eYents immediately preceding the shooting,
interrupting the deputy district attorney's crossexamination to do so. The judge questioned defendant closely to clarify inconsistencies between
his testimony on the stand and statements he had
previously made. After defendant was excused as
a witness and Doctor Brandmeyer was about to
take the stand, the judge recalled defendant and
once again questioned him as to his memory of
the shooting. .L\.fter defendant had been excused
11
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a second time and before Doctor Brandmeyer's
examination began, the parties retired to chambers for a conference." [At which conference the
judge told defense counsel he disbelieved his client,
the accused.]
The California Supreme Court found no impropriety
warranting reversal. It declared:
'' * * * A careful examination of the record convinces us that the judge's questions were not a
guise for conveying to the jury the court's disbelief in defendant's evidence but were asked to
get the truth established, and that they fairly and
impartially brought out relevant and material testimony. Moreover, the judge instructed the jury
that any intimation in his questions or the questions of counsel that certain facts were or were not
true must be disregarded, and he adequately instructed them that they were the exclusive judges
of the effect and value of the evidence.''

In the instant case, the court did not transmit any
indication of his beliefs to the jury. His questioning was
directed towards clarifying and making understandable
the testimony as to physical evidence offered by Officer
Burch. This is a proper action. This limited particip·ation by the court, coupled with his admonition against
drawing inferences, obviously did not result in prejudice. Especially is this clear from a full reading of all
that occurred during the long trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN THE MANNER OF CONDUCTI~G
THE VIEW OF THE SCENE OF THE CRI~IE.

12
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The appellant makes a scattergun attack to the effect
that the court ('lTPd in the manner in which the vie'v of
thP necident scene was conducted. The specific na tnre
of the appellant's objection is not pinpointed, but genprally it may be said that appellant contends that
77-31-26. Utah Code Annotated 1953, 'vas violated. This
sPction provides:
''When in the opinion of the court it is proper
that the jury should view the place in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, or in
"~hirh any other material fact occurred, it may
order the jury to be conducted in a body, in the
custody of an officer, to the place, which must be
sho,vn to them by a person appointed by the court
for that purpose; and the officer must be sworn to
suffer no person to speak or communicate with
the jury, nor do so himself, on any subject connected with the trial, and to return them into
court without unnecessary delay, or at a specified
time.''
The statute is directory in nature. First, it leaves
the matter of the view in the discretion of the trial
judge. Secondly, it requires that a person be appointed
to act as custodian of the jury.
must

be

sworn

against

Third, the officer

unauthorized

communica-

tion. In the instant case the appellant consented to the
view· of the accident scene (T. 441, 443). No objection
\vas raised in the trial court to the judge being present
when the view occurred. No objection was or is made that
the jury \vas not properly in the custody of the sheriff,
indeed the custodian was in charge of the jury.
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Nothing in 77-31-26, U.C.A. 1953, specifies that the
judge may not accompany the jury. It would be a difficult situation if the judge could not view the accident
scene but was still called on to appraise the evidence
as against motions attacking its legal sufficiency. It is
difficult to see in \vhat manner this could in any \vay
prejudice the accused. In State v. Glow, 215 ~finn. :180,
10 N.W. 2d 359 (1943), the Minnesota Supreme Court
indicated that not only was it proper for the trial court
to allow the view, it was equally proper for him to
point out to the jury objects at the locus in quo to better
enable the jury to understand the testimony. ...~lthough
the court reversed, it did so because of the failure to provide a reporter's transcript to sho\Y \Yhat actually occurred. In the instant appeal, all that occurred \vas a matter of record.
The appellant places reliance on State v. Mortensen,
26 Utah 312, 73 Pac. 562 (1903), for the proposition that
the court erred in accompanying the jury. There is no
merit to appellant's contention. That case considered
only the question of the presence of the accused, and did
not consider the presence of the judge. rrhe court merely
quoted from a Kansas case on the necessity of the accused's presence, which case had mentioned that under
Kansas procedure, the judge remains in the courtroom.
Further, since no objection to the judge being present \Yas
voiced, the M orten.sen case would support a conclusion
of waiver. Finally, no reasonable justification can be
shown why the judge should not also Yie'''" the scene, nor
ran any demonstration be made as to ho\v that factor
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could prejudice the accused. Specific prejudice must arise
from thP YiP\V. State v. t.'-{hau·, 39 Utah 536, 205 Pac. 339
()!)~~); 77-4~-1, l~.(~ ...\. 1953. ~\ number of cases haYe
Pxpn'ssly rulPd that an accused has the right to have
th(l judg-P present at the vie,ving and that his absence
tnay hP t'ITor. ~\nno., 47 A.L.R. 2d 1227; 53 Am. Jur.,
Trial, § 446; Anno., 42 L.R.A. 381.
Htteon(lly, the appellant seems to contend that the
eourt ttrre(i in receiving evidence at the scene. Nothing
in ~p(·tion 77 -:~1-26, U.C.~\. 1953, prohibits the court from
('onducting a hearing at the scene in order to allo'v the
jury to hettPr understand the evidence. The cases cited
hy the appellant on the question of the po,ver or propriety
of the trial court receiving evidence at the viewing reflect one line of authority. However, there is an equally
impressive line supporting the trial court conducting a
hea.ring at the scene. Thus, in 23 C.J.S., Cri1ninal Law,
§ 986, p. 994, it is stated:

''According to other authorities, ho\\~eyer, the
purpose of the Yiew is to supply evidence, and the
information received by taking the view constitutes evidence to be considered by the jury the
same as any other evidence introduced in the case.
l"'"nder this theory it is proper to receive explanatory evidenc.e during the taking of the view.''
The landmark case on the conduct of a viewing from
the standpoint of due process of la"'" is Snyder v. 1llassa.chuscfts, 291 l'. S. 97 (1934). In that case the court ordered that the jury Yie"~ the places material to the
charge under consideration - murder. The vie"\\. .ing by
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the jury \Vas conducted in the presence of the judge, couusel, and stenographer. The accused ""'as not present; thus,
the case presented a more impressive situation for a
claim of error. During the course of the Yiewing, items
of concern and interest were c.alled to the jury's attention. The Uuited States Supreme Court found no unconscionable aspects surrounding the case and upheld
the conviction. ~fr. Justice Cardozo analyzed the as pert
of allowing comment or clarification at the scene and
found it to be a valid procedure. He stated:
''Obviously the difference bet,veen a Yie". at
which every one is silent and a vie\Y accompanied
by a request to note this feature or another is onP
of degree, and nothing more. The mere bringing
of a jury to a particular place, whether a building
or a room or a wall "\vith a bullet hole, is in effect
a statement that this is the place which \\. as the
scene of the offense, and a request to examine it.
When the tacit directions are made explicit, the
defendant is not wronged unless the supplement of
" . ords so transforms the quality of the procedure
that injustice \vill be done if the defendant is kept
a\vay.
''Statements to the jury point out the specific
objects to be noted have been a traditional accompaniment of a view for about t\vo centuries, if not
longer. The Fourteenth 1\_mendment has not displaced the procedure of the ages.''
In State '?· llf orfensen, supra, this court found no
error in allo"\\Ting the jury· to pace off distances and make
measurements. Certainly, the procedure in the instant
ra~e, being for purposes of clarification and enlighten-
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ment, cannot be said to have harmed the appellant in any
manner. Wigmore, E rid l'Hce, 3rd Ed., § 1802, p. 247,
noteH:
" It is, moreover, immaterial that the sho,ver
is a party or one 'vho '"ill be an ordinary 'lvitness;
indeed his familiarity 'vith the places is assumed
to be a special qualification; it is only the pointing
out by an unauthorized "ritness that is improper
(supra, par. 2)
'' ( 3) For the same reason, the judge may di-

rect that certain 1£itnesses repeat their testimony
at the view. This is nothing more than an adjournment of the court temporarily to the place
of view, 'vhere the holding of the court is temporarily resumed.'' (Emphasis supplied)
In Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 198 S.E. 441
(1938), the case, like the instant one, involved a death by
automobile. The judge in effect acted as shower and had
"·itnesses point out places and objects of concern. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia., in passing on the
propriety of the Yiewing, noted the decision in Snyder v.
Jlassachu.setts, supra, and the position of Wigmore. The
court found no reversible error, commenting:
"It would have been better and more in keeping "·i th the general practic.e for the court to have
placed the jury in charge of some officer familiar
with the scene and to have authorized him to point
out the pertinent objects with no witnesses for
either side present. However, in this case the
judge himself acted as an official 'shower' and permitted the witnesses for plaintiff and the attorneys for defendants, in the presence of the judge,
to point out to the jury objects and locations men-
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tioned in the testimony previously introduced. If
the court is authorized to select an impartial person to point out pertinent objects and things, surely it is not reversible error for the judge himself
to perform this duty.
"We do not approve of the use of witness2s on
a view, but inasmuch as the witnesses did not
change their testimony in any material W'ay and it
affirmatively appearing that the full opportunity
was given defendants to sho'v to the jury any and
every object and thing mentioned in the testimon:~,
the judgment will not be reversed.''
It is the position of the Attorney General that this
court is passing upon the legal issue raised by the appeal without benefit of controlling stare decisis. As a consequence, the court may examine not only the facts of
this case, vvhich rather conclusively sho"r no prejudice to
the appellant other than a fair disclosure of \Yhat allegedly transpired, but also the question of \Yhether or not
the conduct herein complained of violates any policy of
criminal jurisprudence. In State v. O'Day, 188 La. 169,
175 So. 839 ( 1937), a situation occurred very similar to
that complained of by the instant appeal. The opinion
notes:
''This Bill was taken to the ruling of the Court,
"\vhich permitted certain \Yitnesses to testify at the
scene of the crime. The bill recites that the Court
was in session at the scene of the crime; that ail
the officers of the Court, as well as the Jury, the
defendant and his counsel, and the prosecuting
attorneys were present. The Bill does not object
to the Yisit to the scene, but objects to the taking
of testimony at the scene. The scene \vas visited
and testimony taken on motion of the State. All
18
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of the \vitnesses ,,·ho testified at thP scenP of the
crime \vith one lPsser exception had already test i tied in full as State \Vi tnesses in the court room.
The Court concurred \Yi th the State in the belief
thn t it \Vas neeessary for a proper understanding
of thP eviden('P, and that the Jury may have a fair
nnd better opportunity to pass upon the eredihilitv of ePrtain material \vitnesses, that the Jury
be p~rmitted to visit the locus of the crime, * * * ''
The court, in affirming the conYiction, stated:

•' This Court respectfully believes that it \vas a
matter of necessity as well as intelligent procedure that witnesses point out to the Jury the pa.rtieular part of the automobile to which the evidence adhered; to have the Jury see for themselves how well the body of the car had been
sealed to preserve the evidence in its interior, and
consequently how genuine was this evidenee to
have \\·i h1esses show \Yhere, in the interior of the
car, the fa tal bullet was recovered and other rna terial features of the case so nec.essary for the Jury
to have accurate knowledge of ...
• • The purpose of a trial is to ascertain
the truth. It is impossible to bring the locus into
the court and introduc.e it in evidence. It is now
\\·ell reeognized, and there is no dispute herein
raised to the contrary, that Courts may take the
jury to Yie\\'" the scene. Upon examination of the
authorities of the different States, w·e find t\vo
theories as to \vhether or not a. vie\v of the sc.ene
constitutes the taking of eYidence. One theory
holds that a Yie\v of the scene does not constitute
taking of evidence. The other theory, in our opinion conforming more to reason, is that a view of
the scene does constitute the taking of eYidence .
. . . It is only reasonable that, viewing the scene,
the physical facts and the circumstances sur~' •
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rounding the scene is as much the taking of eYidence as taking the testimony of 'Yitnesses. A
view of the scene without explanation might ronfuse the jury. Such confusion in many instanrrR
might operate against the defendant and do him
great harm. Such confusion may defeat justice.
The explanation of the locus "~ould enable the jur~·
to determine the real truth. Neither the State or
the defendant have any right to complain at injury caused by the truth. Witnesses are permitted
to dra'Y diagrams of the locus, 'Yhile testifying
in court, and to testify and explain the locus from
the diagram and to point out the different objcets
on the diagram to the jur~~. It does not conform
to reason to say that you can dra"~ a diagram of
the locus and explain it "~ith testimony but cannot
point out the objects at the locus and explain it
'Yith testimony. It would seem that it "rould be
better to explain the locus by testimony on the
scene so that the jury would have a clear understanding of all the testimony in the case. It is
best that the jury c.Iearly understand the case. It
is to be borne in mind that the average juror has
had very limited experience in the trial of cases
and often it is very difficult for them to get a clear
picture of the locus, the position of the different
witnesses and objects from a detailed narration of
the same hv., the witnesses. It is better in manY.
instances to aid a jury by taking it to the scene
and having the scene explained to them in order
that they 1nay clearly understand it and arriYe at
the real truth with reference to it. It could not be
said that an explanation of the scene clarifying
the testimony given in the trial did not giYe the
defendant a fair and impartial trial. .A.s a matter
of fact it 'vould make the trial fairer and more
impartial. ... \Ve cannot see how it could injure
the defendant to explain and clarify the seene and
obtain the truth.
20
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•' If it is in the discretion of the Court to permit the jury to view the scene, it is also within the
discretion of the Court to permit the taking of
PYidence at the scene to explain it. There is nothing in the record to show any abuse of this discretion.''
Clearly, sound judicial procedures will better serve
the ends of ascertaining truth so that justice may be done.
The procedure adopted by the trial court in this instance
\vas geared toward allowing the jury to fully appreciate
the testimony previously given. Counsel, the accused,
the judge, and reporter 'vere present. The proceedings,
but for the absence of the austere surroundings of a
courtroom, did no violence to the judicious search for
truth. Clearly, no prejudice could result or did result
and no basis for reversal is shown.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT
ERROR IN DENYING
~lOTION TO STRIKE
TESTIMONY AS TO
1\IENTS.

DID NOT COMMIT
THE DEFENDANT'S
OFFICER BURCH'S
CHORD MEASURE-

.A.t the time of trial, Officer William Burch of the
State Highway Patrol testified that he arrived at the
scene of the accident 'vithin a few minutes of the accident (T. 25-27). He marked the position of the overturned vehicle ( T. 27), and then a few hours later took
measurements of the vehicle markings, 'vhich were still
visible (T. 29). He testified without objection to the
measurements he made, including the chord mark measurement (T. 31-34).
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On cross-examination, the defense counsel, using a
transcript, called the officer's attention to a statement
he made at preliminary hearing, "Therein he indicated
that he did not know if he even measured the chord
mark (T. 139). After that, the follo,ving question ·was
posed at T. 139:
"But, now, on redirect examination it is yonr
testimony -let me rephrase that. On direct examination you testified as to particular points that
you measured it from, is that right?
"That's right."
Thus, the effect of the cYiclcllrc at this stage \Yas only
that Officer Burch's testimony may haYc been impeached.
Thereafter, the record reflects at T. 139:
''All right. N O\V, then, on redirect examination, you testified that you got those marks after
the preliminary hearing by you and Sergeant
Reid and nir. ~Iason sitting down and discussing
it, is that right~
''We remembered where

\YC

measured.

''And yon came up \Yith a mark for purposes of
this trial, isn't that right, Officer~
''That is not right.
"The three of you discussed it and came up
\\~ith a mark, isn't that right~
'' \\T e remembered

\\~here

''After the preliminary

\Yc measured it.

hearing~

"That's right."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

HuhsPqU(lntly, counsel made a motion to strike (T. 140).

'rlu· t rin 1 judge denit'tl the motion to strike, stating ihe
following reason at T. 1-l-0:
· ~ • • ~ ~I r. Burns, my thinking on it is this:
'rhP fart that the officer later discusses the point
that "·as made at the preliminary hearing and his
reeollection is refreshed does not prove that it is
fabrienting anything; and I don't think his testimouy so shows. It may or may not, I 'llleave that up
to the Jury·; but the fact that he discussed it 'vith
<)fficrr ~I a son and Officer Reid and between them
hy discussing this, his recollection is refreshed
and he testifies \\"ith regard to a certain item
in this rase doesn't prove that he is fabricating
anything either now or before. It proves merely
his testimony is different by reason of the fact that
his trstimony may be now fabricated - it might
be fabricated before or it might be truthful on
both occasions because he didn't recall before and
he now recalls by virtue of having it refreshed.
I'm going to overrule and deny your motion and
lea Ye that point up to the Jury.''
X o evidence \Yas offered to sho'v that the evidence,
in fact, \\·as not the result of Officer Burch's independent
recollection after discussing the matter 'Yi th other officers.
Further. his testimony on direct examination 'vas that of
a "·itness testifying to his o'vn recollection. Therefore,
at lPast, the evidence presented a question for the jury,
'vhich is \\"hat the court indicated.

In Abbott, C'rin1inal Trial Practice, 4th Ed. ~ 353, it
is stated:
'~The failure to object to a question before

answer, if the grounds of objection were then
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apparent, precludes a subsequent motion to strike
out the answer."
Counsel in the instant case had the preliminn ry
hearing transcript and could haYe tested the "~itness 's
memory by voire dire 2 examination or objected until
foundation had been laid to show the "\\ itness "~as, in fart,
testifying from his own memory. Consequently, it is apparent that the motion came too late.
7

A motion to strike in the first instance is not a favored procedure. Abbott, supra, § 352, and the motion is
usually a matter for the sound discretion of the trial
court. Thus, in 23A, C.J.S., Crinzinal Lazr, § 1069, p. 45,
it is noted:
''The grant or refusal of a motion to strike
improper evidence may be viewed as a matter
ithin the sound discretion of the court, as \Yhere
the evidence was admitted \Yithout objection, see
infra § 1070. Thus a motion to strike evidence
because of facts elirited on cross-examination
sho\ving it to be incompetent has been held to be
discretionary \Yith the court.''
7
"\\

From the evidence in the instant case, it does not
clearly appear that the officer had testified apart from his
own memory. He indicated that the discussions he had
"~ith the other officers caused him to rec.all the chord
measurement. The effect of his testimony \Yas properly
left to the jury to accord it \\~hat \veight they \vould. No
error ran be claimed on this basis.
2

A procedure the appellant used numerous times during the trial.
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POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE AMPLY ESrrABLISHES
THE APPELLANT'S GUILT BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
rrhe appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to
establish his guilt. It is submitted that there is no merit
to such a contention. In State v. Berchtold, 11 U. 2d
208, :~:>7 P. 2d 183 (1960), this court stated with refert1nee to Yie,ving the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
from a conviction for negligent homicide in violation of
41-6-4:t10, U.C.A. 1953:
''We reverse a jury verdict only where we conclude from a consideration of all of the evidence
and the inferences therefrom viewed in the light
most favorable to such verdict that the findings
are unreasonable.''
Vie,ving the evidence in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, it is clear that the evidence is amply sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The evidence discloses that the appellant drove his
vehicle up Cedar Canyon at far in excess of the posted
speed limit of 50 miles per hour. Persons who viewed
his speed or "~ere riding with him estimated his speed
as high as 70 miles per hour ( T. 317, 329). The terrain
'~as a winding, curving, canyon road. The appellant's
vehicle was specially built for high speeds, so that estimates might reasonably be far less than actual speed,
and most of the estimates were given by witnesses favorable to the appellant. The journey took place at nighttime after the accused had consumed at least four beers
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and maybe more. Although the appellant may not haYP
been drunk the consumption of alcohol must haYe had
some effect on his person, if no more than to relax his
reeaction time. Thus, in Campbell, Courts and Prosecutors Are the Weak Link in Preventing Drunk D1~i1·iug,
46 A.B.A.J. 43 (1960), at p. 45, it is stated:
''The Committee on Medical Aspects of Automobile Injuries and Deaths of the American Medical Association more recently has published a
'Medical Guide for Physicians in Determining
Fitness to Drive a Motor Vehicle.' 'Two 12-oz.
bottles of 3.2% beer or 2 oz. of 100 proof whiskey
consumed within one hour will put the average
moderate drinker in the zone of impaired driving
ability, i. e., with over 0.035% alcohol in the
blood ... ' "
The testimony of the highway patrol experts put
the speed of the appellant's car at between 99 to 100
miles per hour, based on over 700 feet of scuff and skid
marks. At the start of the trip, appellant showed little
concern for safety by running a stop sign. Appellant,
immediately after the accident, admitted racing and accepted guilt for Christine Lambert's death. The evidence
presented in this case is very, very similar to that before
the court in State v. Berchtold, 11 U. 2d 208, 357 P. 2d
183 (1960), where this court found the evidence sufficient
to convict. In that case, a young girl was also killed
where the car rolled over on a turn. Clearly, the evidence in the instant case meets the test required under
the law to convict.

')C
·~0
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CONCLUSION
The instant rase merely aeceHtuates the fact that
~kill ful counsel can al\\·ays find something to raise on
appeal. Ho,vever, the record in this case also demon~trntP~ an unusually cautious and fair attitude on the part
of thP trial judge, "·ho appeared to be seeking only the
truth. The appraisal of the errors claimed, against the
rPeord as it actually exists, makes it manifest that the
appellant 'vaR in no 'vay prejudiced except by the truth.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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